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1. Introduction 
 
The national labour market is an integral of its disaggregated components in 
various dimensions, such as by the type of economic activity, demographic 
characteristics or by internal political geography. In this paper we study the 
last dimension by examining dynamic multi-equation panel models of data 
from the States and Territories and their respective capital cities in Australia.1 
The national, or aggregate, labour market experience has been well 
documented and extensively analysed (for recent examples on the Australian 
economy, see Debelle and Vickery (1998b), Gruen, Pagan and Thompson 
(1999), and Beechey et al (2000)). In the massive macroeconometric 
literature, there is an untested presumption that the use of national aggregate 
data is always appropriate. Accordingly there has been very little empirical 
macroeconomic analysis at a disaggregated level. However it is reasonable to 
ask whether macroeconometric analysis is sufficiently undertaken using 
nationally aggregated data, or whether one gains by using pooled procedures 
on panels of state-level data, or indeed whether one should treat states as 
separate, independent macroeconomic entities. There are at least three good 
reasons for thinking that there are gains to be had from an empirical dynamic 
panel study of state-disaggregated labour markets. 
The first reason is that it is likely that geography matters for the 
economic activities of a country, particularly for one that is physically large 
and diverse. Countries like Australia, the USA, UK, Mexico and Canada are 
likely to be sufficiently diverse geographically to justify studying state-
disaggregated models. One may expect less gain for countries like the 
Netherlands, Ireland or perhaps New Zealand. In the last twenty years, the 
importance of geography for explaining international trade has been well 
documented. Equally, one might expect geography to matter for intranational 
economic activities in a physically large and diverse country. With sufficient 
data now available at the state level (at least in Australia) for 
macroeconometric modelling of wages, prices, employment and the labour 
force, it is important to determine the key characteristics and 
                                                     
1 For ease of expression, henceforth we shall refer to ‘states’ only.  
interrelationships of that data. There is a growing literature that studies 
interstate economic relations (which we discuss below), but we are aware of 
no previous research that jointly models real wages, employment and the 
labour force across states within a country. Given the diversity of the 
economic geography in a country, we need to establish whether the 
maintained model should account for possible parameter heterogeneity and 
the imperfect correlation of shocks across states.  
A second and related reason is that there is growing evidence that 
state level variables persistently deviate from long run national trends for 
much longer than one might have expected. With national macro-modelling, 
there is an implicit assumption of an insignificant loss of information from 
using data that takes sums or weighted averages of its components. 
Underlying this assumption is the belief that internal labour, goods and 
financial markets are highly integrated, very efficient and with very low 
barriers to trade. Thus, deviations from national trends ought to be corrected 
rapidly. It turns out that this is not always true. Debelle and Vickery (1998a) 
construct a panel macro model for Australia, focussing on unemployment 
across states, and test whether interstate mobility is an important part of the 
adjustment mechanism following state-specific shocks. They find that 
permanent (or at least very persistent) differences between states remain. 
Most migration occurs within 4 years, which is a significant amount of time. 
Dixon and Shepherd (2001) reject tests for common trends for unemployment 
rates across Australian states, but find common cycles, thus leading to the 
conclusion that regional unemployment policies are needed. With regard to 
state-wide consumer price indices, panel unit root tests of intranational 
purchasing power parity do tend to reject the hypothesis of no cointegration, 
but the implied persistence of deviations after shocks remains substantial.2  
These examples suggest that segmentation is widespread across various inter-
state markets which therefore should not be assumed homogenous, 
                                                     
2 In the case of Australia, Chaudhuri and Sheen (2001) find persistence measured as a half-life of 7 to 8 
quarters for panel unit root tests of city CPIs. Cechetti, Mark and Sonora (2000) find much slower 
convergence of CPIs for US cities, with a half-life of about 8 years. 
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particularly in the short run, and further that there may be information gains 
from working with disaggregated dynamic panels.  
A third reason for studying state panels is a technical one - they may 
resolve the notoriously low power problem of stationarity tests when using 
aggregate data over short time spans. One solution to the problem is to 
lengthen the historical span of the data, but this raises the risk of needing to 
introduce structural breaks to the model. In addition, aggregate national 
macroeconometric models are notorious for their very complex and ad hoc 
lag structures, and this problem would probably worsen if longer time spans 
were introduced. An alternative strategy is to try to gain information by 
drawing on data from the component cross-sections of national macro 
variables – the pooling or averaging across the components may achieve 
significant noise reduction. By taking this approach, we hope to extract 
information from the cross-section dimension, thus raising the power of the 
stationarity tests. 
To study our panel of labour market variables for the states of 
Australia over 107 quarters from 1972:3-1999:1, we set up a general error 
correction model derived from a theoretical framework for dynamic 
macroeconomics. The resultant VAR model includes all lagged endogenous 
variables in each equation, as well as some driving exogenous variables. We 
examine two long run hypotheses: the relationship between wages and 
productivity (which suggests a negative relationship between the real wage 
and employment), and the ‘wage curve’ hypothesis of Blanchflower and 
Oswald (1994) (with a negative relationship between unemployment and 
wages). The short run hypotheses include new Keynesian employment 
dynamics with Phillips curves for wages and prices.  
With our dynamic modelling, we raise the important question: “Does 
state heterogeneity matter?”  The answer to this question is important given 
that most macroeconomic modelling is done using national aggregates 
presuming little cost to that aggregation. We tested for state heterogeneity in 
two ways. First, we estimated our dynamic panel model assuming all 
parameters are constant across states. The estimates from this pooled 
procedure are consistent in a dynamic model only if we have state 
homogeneity (see Pesaran and Smith (1995)), and so the existence of state 
heterogeneity would generate a serious problem. Thus we tested whether 
each parameter (one at a time) is the same across states. We find that we can 
reject the equality across states for many parameters in our model, which 
means that pooled estimates for these are biased measures of the average 
effects of the relevant variables. Second, we aggregated our state data, and 
then estimated an identical dynamic structural model with this aggregate data, 
testing then to see if the component state variables have any impact. Again, 
Pesaran and Smith (1995) have shown that the parameter estimates are 
inconsistent for this procedure in the presence of significant state 
heterogeneity. Our findings are that the component state data for many 
variables do have significant impacts on the aggregate procedure. Thus we 
conclude that state heterogeneity does indeed matter, implying biased 
estimates in our aggregate procedure. 
In our third and final procedure, which acts as as a comparison to the 
pooled panel and the aggregate procedures, we estimated our four equation 
model for each state separately and obtained mean group estimates for all 
parameters. These mean group estimates are consistent for panels with a 
sufficiently large number of observations across time and states. Thus 
Pesaran and Smith (1995) recommend estimating individual micro (state) 
relationships separately when studying panels large in the time dimension. 
Since we only have a small number of states in our macro panel, a small 
sample bias may exist in our mean group results.  
Having submitted our basic structural model to three procedures 
(pooling, aggregating and mean group estimates) we can then ask which 
performs best. Since each procedure suffers from some bias, the answer to 
this question is not obvious. If states are genuinely independent, then the 
mean group estimates will do best. If their shocks are perfectly correlated and 
their economies are identical, then aggregating the states for national 
macromodelling is appropriate. If they are not independent, their shocks are 
imperfectly correlated, and not identical in structure, it becomes an empirical 
issue to decide whether the pooled procedure will dominate the other two. 
The loss from imposing parameter equality restrictions has to be weighed 
against the gain from accounting for the covariances of the error processes. 
Therefore we obtain an answer by comparing the out-of-sample forecasting 
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performance of the three procedures. Our results from the forecasting 
exercise (in terms of either root mean square errors or Theil’s U statistic) 
indicate that even though we are unable to reject state heterogeneity, our 
pooled model is the most preferred model. This suggests that the gains from 
accounting for the error covariances across states dominate the losses 
removed by dealing with state parameter heterogeneity, and that aggregation 
of the data is too heavy-handed. 
In the next section we provide a theoretical framework for the 
dynamic models that will be estimated. In Section III, we discuss the key 
features of the data and see whether the labour market experiences of the 
various states were statistically different. In Section IV, we explain the tests 
that we use for panel unit roots and panel cointegration. Section V presents 
the results, and then some concluding comments are offered in Section VI. 
 
2. A Theoretical Framework for Estimation 
 
In this section, we outline a dynamic macroeconomic equilibrium model of 
many states with temporary wage and price rigidities.  From this framework, 
we obtain dynamic equations for wage and price inflation, employment and 
the labour force in the first four sub-sections. After explaining the 
framework, we discuss the empirical implementation of the model, which is 
in the form of a dynamic vector error correction system in sub-section 5. In 
II.6, we explain how we test for heterogeneity and how we compare the three 
procedures.  
2.1 Nominal Wage-Setting  
Nominal wages3, W, are set by processes involving insider (or firm-specific) 
factors such as productivity, and outsider factors such as the state of the 
labour market.4 The theories behind this approach include bargaining, search, 
contract and efficiency wage models. 
                                                     
3 All variables are in logarithms unless stated otherwise. 
4 For a detailed analysis of this approach, see Layard et al (1991) Chapters 8 and 9. 
Representing the insider factors, we use the gap between the real 
wage (W-P, where P is the price level) and the marginal product of ‘inside’ 
labour, MPL, ie of those workers who are party to the wage bargain. This 
marginal product should depend on employment, EM, and other factors, 
though unfortunately, data on other factors (and output) at the state level are 
unavailable in Australia.  
The outside factors include the change in unemployment, ∆U 
(measured as ∆LF-∆EM, where LF is the labour force), the gap between the 
level of unemployment, U, relative to its long run value, U*, and the expected 
future inflation rate, Et[∆Pit+1]. The change in unemployment may matter 
because the competition for jobs can be more intense from the recently 
unemployed than from the long-term unemployed. We consider U* to be a 
function of the real wage, and a deterministic trend following the ‘wage 
curve’ hypothesis of Blanchflower and Oswald (1994).5 There are a number 
of justifications for the negative relationship between real wages and 
unemployment.6  We test to see whether the ‘wage curve’ hypothesis is 
supported in our more aggregated macroeconometric panel, which has more 
information in the time dimension than the normal microeconometric panel.7 
                                                     
5 Blanchflower and Oswald show that this hypothesis of a negative correlation in the logarithmic 
levels of real wages and unemployment appears to be supported statistically by micro-level panel 
data for many countries, using repeated and pooled cross-sections (though see Card (1995) for a 
critical survey). 
6 A number of justifications can be provided to explain the negative relationship between real 
wages and unemployment. One could be the efficiency wage model of Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984). 
Another explanation can arise in a union bargaining context – higher unemployment lowers the 
union’s threat point, leading to a lower equilibrium wage bargain. Another could be based on a 
search model of frictional unemployment 
7 Kennedy and Borland (2000) study the ‘wage curve’ hypothesis in the Australian context, using 
microeconometric cross-sections and panels. They work with the Australian Bureau of Statistics 
Income Distribution Survey for 1982, 1986, 1990 and 1994/5. Their data involves a very wide 
cross-section at the individual level, and so is quite different to our data set. They are able to find 
extensive Australian evidence in support of the Blanchflower and Oswald (1994) hypothesis of a 
static  negative elasticity of –0.1 between individual wage levels and various more aggregate 
measures of unemployment. The robustness of their result depends on the inclusion of state fixed 
effects. 
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Given that contracts across a state are formed at different times of the 
year to last for varying periods, we get a staggered wage setting relation that 
anticipates the effects of future inflation on the expected real wage. We 
assume that expected future inflation, Et[∆Pit+1 ], is a linear projection of 
currently available information. Since there is no reason to assume a more 
restricted model for expectations (such as static, adaptive, or rational 
expectations), we prefer to allow a general linear projection. Given our 
particular state dataset, the available information set will be restricted to 
include lagged wage and price inflation, employment, the labour force, plus 
exogenous oil prices and the external terms of trade. As a consequence of the 
above analysis, the wage-setting equation takes the form: 
∆Wit   =  c1  +   ec11 (Wit-1 –Pit-1– MPLit-1) + ec21 (Uit-1 – U*t-1 ) + 
w1(L) ∆Wit-1  + p1(L) ∆Pit-1    
     +  em1(L) ∆EMit-1  +  lf1(L) ∆LFit-1  + tot1(L) ∆TOTt + oil1(L) ∆ 
POILt +  v1it      (1) 
where the parameter functions (shown in lower case) are polynomial 
distributions of the lag operator, L (for example, w1(L) = w11L + w12L2 +….); 
c1 is a constant, i is an index for the particular state, t is the index for time, 
TOT is the external terms of trade, POIL is the local currency value of the 
world oil price and v1i is a random wage shock. 
2.2  Price-Setting 
On the price-setting side, we assume that there are imperfectly competitive 
firms that set their prices optimally, recognizing that the frequency of future 
price adjustment is constrained by a fixed Calvo-type probability rule. This 
probability leads to a gradual adjustment of aggregate prices to deviations of 
real marginal cost from its steady state value, mcit. In addition price changes 
will depend on expected future price changes, Et[∆Pit+1 ] and shocks, uit, 
arising on the demand side8 : 
∆Pit   = δ mcit + β Et[∆Pit+1 ]  + uit    
    
                                                     
8 See Clarida et al (1999) for more detail on this relationship. 
We shall assume that mcit can be driven by the lagged gap between 
unemployment and its long run value, by the deviation between the real wage 
and marginal labour productivity, and on other cost-push shocks, such as oil 
prices. If unemployment is unusually high, demand and therefore output will 
be lower, which will put downward pressure on marginal cost. Oil prices pick 
up an exogenous cost of production that may be partly passed on to final 
goods consumers. The terms of trade is a possible external demand shock - 
higher world output enhances national export demand, and thus export prices 
and the terms of trade. This will be associated with higher national and state 
incomes and demand, leading to pressure on goods prices (as well as a rise in 
employment). If expected future inflation, Et[∆Pit+1 ], is some projection of 
currently available information, then the price inflation equation9 takes the 
form: 
∆Pit   = c2   +  ec12 (Wit-1 –Pit-1– MPLit-1) + ec22 (Uit-1 – U*t-1 ) +  w2(L) 
∆Wit-1  + p2 (L) ∆Pit-1      
  + em2(L) ∆EMit-1  +  lf2(L) ∆LFit-1  + tot2(L) ∆TOTt + oil2(L) ∆POILt 
+ +  v2it                  (2) 
where v2i is a random price shock. 
2.3  Employment Determination 
Output supply in each state is produced by labour, EMit, and other factors, via 
a standard constant returns production function. In the short run, if the 
demand for state goods is temporarily less than supply, inventories build up 
until eventually firms reduce production by layoffs and allowing spare 
capacity. Absorbing inventories into real investment, the goods market 
equilibrium is where state demand equals actual production and is thus 
demand-driven in equilibrium. If the demand constraint does not bind, profit-
                                                     
9 Gruen, Pagan and Thompson (1999) study the Phillips curve for wages and prices in Australia. 
For price and unit labour cost in an expectations-augmented Phillips curve, they find a role for the 
level of unemployment (related to the NAIRU) and its rate of change (the ‘speed limit’ effect). 
Beechey, Bharucha, Cagliarini, Gruen and Thompson (2000) estimate a small model of the 
Australian economy using single equation methods. Amongst five key variables, they estimate 
Phillips curves for unit labour cost and price. In both of these papers, their preferred equations 
include very complex lags as well as various forcing variables. 
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maximising employment is where the real wage equals the marginal product 
of labour. In the short run, deviations might be tolerated but they could be 
gradually corrected by wage adjustments and by hiring or firing. If demand 
exceeds supply, inventories are run down, leading to abnormally high 
employment, and eventually an increase in capacity. Over time then, the state 
goods market equation may include both demand factors and the wage-
productivity gap.  
Aggregate state demand arises from a number of sources - state 
residents, other state residents, foreign residents. Aggregate consumption of 
state residents includes their imports from other states and other countries. 
Thus aggregate state demand is the sum of state consumption, real 
investment, the balance of trade with every other state, the balance of trade 
with other foreign countries, and a random shock. We shall now explain how 
these five are determined in our model. 
First, with the representative state household optimising an 
intertemporal utility function, we can obtain the standard, first order or Euler 
condition for state consumption, which exhibits some degree of smoothing 
over time. Log-linearising this, the log of consumption obeys a random walk 
with a drift explained by the rate of time preference and the expected real 
interest rate. Second, the representative firm chooses a real investment path to 
maximize expected intertemporal profits, subject to the production function 
and convex costs of installation. Given the forward-looking properties of the 
shadow (or market) price of capital, the equilibrium is found on a saddlepath 
relating investment to the price. When demand is not a constraint, log-
linearised investment becomes a random walk with a drift explained by the 
expected real interest rate. When demand is constrained, the level of demand 
also affects investment10. Third, the balance of trade with other states may 
depend on relative state prices, but should be driven more by macroeconomic 
factors. We will assume that these are picked up by multiplier factors, which 
we cannot identify in our dynamic panel model. Interstate shocks will be 
accommodated in our estimations through the error variance-covariance 
                                                     
10 For example see Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996) for detailed derivations of the consumption and 
investment paths.  
matrix. The fourth factor, the balance of foreign trade for the state, is 
determined by the terms of trade and oil prices. Finally, the random shock to 
state output may arise from innovations in fiscal policy or unspecified supply 
and demand factors coming from other states or countries. 
Bringing these five relationships into the goods market equilibrium 
condition that has been log-linearised and expressed in first differences, we 
can obtain a dynamic IS equation.11 Current output depends on expected 
future output, the expected real interest rate, the terms of trade and oil prices. 
If the expected values of future variables are some projection from currently 
available state information, we can express actual output growth as a linear 
function of lags of itself, of inflation, the changes in the terms of trade and oil 
prices, perhaps the unemployment gap, plus a random error.  
State output growth translates to an equivalent employment growth 
equation by inverting the production function. To the resultant employment 
growth equation, we add the error correction term, reflecting the real wage-
productivity gap that may also drive employment when demand constraints 
do not bind12. The general form of the employment equation for estimation 
becomes: 
∆EMit  = c3  + ec13(Wit-1 –Pit-1 – MPi-1t)    + ec23(Uit-1 – U*t-1 ) +  w3(L) 
∆Wit-1 + p3(L) ∆Pit-1   
+  em3(L) ∆EMit-1  +  lf3(L) ∆LFit-1  +  tot3(L) ∆TOTt + oil3(L) ∆POILt 
+  v3it     (3) 
where v3i is a random employment shock..  
2.4  Labour Force 
Finally, the labour force growth in a state is assumed predetermined, but can 
adjust over time through a myriad of national factors, such as immigration, 
net births, net retirements etc, and through inter-state migration if there are 
                                                     
11 Clarida et al (1999) apply similar arguments to establish a dynamic IS curve. 
12 Russell and Tease (1991) test an error correction model for Australian employment from 1969 
to 1987. The restrictions implied by this model on a more general 2nd order model cannot be 
rejected, though a first order Koyck model’s restrictions for the error correction one cannot be 
rejected. 
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changes in relative expected real income after discounting for the associated 
costs. Thus if expected real wages are seen to rise permanently in a state, both 
immigration to that state and the participation rate in the state should 
increase. However if real wages are seen to rise only temporarily, this might 
be seen as reducing employment opportunities, and thus may discourage 
participation. The same argument may apply to oil price increases. A lower 
value of lagged employment change in a state (or higher unemployment) is 
likely to discourage some people from participating in the labour force. This 
is the ‘discouraged worker’ hypothesis. It is also possible that this hypothesis 
may operate through the wage-productivity gap and the unemployment gap. 
Bringing all of the above together, we obtain the following first difference 
relationship: 
   ∆LFit  = c4  +  ec14 (Wit-1 –Pit-1 – MPi-1t)  +  ec24 (Uit-1 – U*t-1 ) + 
w4(L) ∆Wit-1 + p4(L) ∆Pit-1   
            +  em4(L) ∆EMit-1  +  lf4(L) ∆LFit-1   + tot4(L) ∆TOTt + oil4(L) 
∆POILt  + v4it       (4) 
where v4i is a random labour supply shock. 
2.5 Estimation of the Dynamic Four Equation Model Across Seven States 
The dynamic model that we will test is based on (1)-(4), and to implement the 
tests we use a two step procedure. The first step involves establishing 
possible cointegrating relationships among our variables, which are often 
interpreted as hypotheses of the long run. At the most general level, we can 
test for the long run cointegrating relationships by running separate 
regressions for each state involving nominal wages, Wit, prices, Pit, 
employment, EMit, the labour force, LFit, a trend, and a constant picking up 
fixed effects13. Arising from the theoretical framework given above are only 
                                                     
13 In addition, one could include time dummies in the panel cointegration model, which would 
eliminate the effects of all common global trends without explaining the source of exogenous 
aggregate shocks. Without time dummies, one runs the risk of omitted variable bias. However that 
is a risk in any macroeconometric model. Further, Fortin, Keil and Symons (2001) in a study of 
unemployment in a panel of regions and demographic groups in Canada, use a Hausman test for 
the omitted variable bias related to missing Canada-wide trends and find that these missing trends 
two possible cointegrating vectors14, which are the terms attached to the 
parameters ec1i and ec2i in (1)-(4). 
EC1: The real wage-marginal productivity relationship 
Labour market pressure may arise on the demand for labour side, 
yielding a long run relationship between the real wage and the marginal 
productivity of labour. If the real wage is excessively high, then the current 
level of employment will exceed the underlying long run value, and there will 
be negative labour market pressure that should encourage gradual reductions 
in wages, maybe rises in prices and possible declines in employment. The 
estimated error for each state i and time t from the (FM-OLS) regression of 
this relationship is defined as it1CˆE , and its lagged value enters the dynamic 
model as a generated regressor for the first error correction effect:  
i0i0iti0iti0itit cˆTRENDtˆEMmˆePpˆW1CˆE −−−−=  
   (5) 
Since other factor inputs and output data are unavailable at the state level, the 
trend term in (5) is likely to pick up scale effects as well as changes in total 
factor productivity.  
EC2 – The unemployment gap 
A second possibility is that outside labour market pressure arises 
from the difference between actual unemployment and its long run trend 
value, U*. This gap may be associated with the ‘wage curve’ that negatively 
relates the level of real wages to unemployment.  If the actual real wage rises, 
the long run level of unemployment falls, creating negative labour market 
pressure that may force down wage and price inflation, and possibly even 
reducing labour force participation. For this possible cointegrating 
relationship, we represent unemployment as LF-EM and expect the parameter 
estimate on the wage rate to be negative, and on the price level to be positive 
                                                                                                                              
are not a problem (with a p-value of 15%) for three out of four demographic groups, and not for 
the fourth at 1%. 
14 We did try to estimate a cointegrating relationship between the labour force and the real wage, 
representing a long run labour supply function. However the estimates led us to reject this 
hypothesis. 
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in the absence of money illusion15. The estimated error, defined as it2C
~E , 
becomes the second error correction regressor: 
i0i0iti0iti0ititit c~TRENDt
~Pp~Ww~EMLF2C~E −−−−−=  
    (6) 
At the second step, we estimated the short run dynamic model, 
substituting the lagged estimated errors from (5) and (6) as regressors in place 
of the wage-productivity and unemployment gaps as shown in (1)-(4). Our 
general error correction system has four endogenous labour market variables 
(m=1,..4) for each of the seven states (i=1,..7) over the time period of 107 
quarters (t=1972:3,..1999:1). The error variables (v1,, v2 ,v3,, v4) shown in (1)-
(4) may be correlated across states and across labour market variables, but 
independent through time. In each of the dynamic equations, seasonal 
dummies are also included (with a structural break assumed for wages from 
1981 – see footnote 18 below) but not shown in (1)-(4). The dynamic models 
were estimated using non-linear least squares, which is equivalent to SUR in 
this context. We resorted to non-linear estimation because of the many cross-
equation restrictions that are imposed (and subsequently singly tested). The 
SUR method implies that unexplained correlations across states for each 
variable (which may arise from aggregate shocks) and across variables, can 
be accounted for in the estimation of the error variance-covariance matrix. 
Though our least squares estimates are consistent under relatively weak 
assumptions, in case heteroscedasticity and/or serial correlation remain, we 
use the Newey-West correction (with a fourth order moving average) for the 
standard errors and the covariance matrix.  
2.6 Aggregation Tests 
Though the general model allows all estimated parameters to differ across 
states, we do not have enough degrees of freedom to attempt that. Instead, for 
our first procedure, we restricted all parameters in (1)-(4) to be constant 
                                                     
15 This issue does not appear to be of concern in the micro-based studies of the wage curve. 
There, goods prices are assumed to be identical within and across regions (eg see Blanchard and 
Katz (1997)), and so are assumed to be picked up by time dummies. We prefer to include regional 
prices and to treat them as jointly endogenous variables.  
across states, thus obtaining pooled estimates. Then we tested the state 
equality restriction for each parameter of the dynamic panel model, one at a 
time. These results will give us one answer to the question about whether 
state heterogeneity exists. If it does, our pooled estimates will be flawed. As 
shown by Pesaran and Smith (1995), pooled estimators are inconsistent with 
a heterogenous dynamic panel. By wrongly ignoring heterogeneity in the 
presence of serially correlated regressors, the errors become serially 
correlated, which implies inconsistent estimates of dynamic models even as 
the number of observations in time grows. The asymptotic bias is greater for 
a larger degree of heterogeneity.  
A second approach to that question is obtained by aggregating the 
state data on each endogenous variable, and then estimating the four equation 
model with the same general structure as the panel model. To test for state 
heterogeneity, we then added the individual state component variables into 
the model for this second procedure, one variable at a time; if the aggregation 
is adequate, these component variables should have no significant effect in 
the aggregate model. As an example of our procedure, consider AR(1) 
models of  two variables, x1 and x2, with AR parameters, ρ1 and ρ2. 
Aggregating to x =x1+x2, the model for x becomes: 
xt= ρ xt-1 + (ρ1-ρ)  x1t-1 + (ρ2-ρ) x2t-1 + ut  
If the aggregation is appropriate, the parameter estimates for the component 
variables should be insignificant. As it is possible that the best model for the 
aggregate data does not have the same structure as the one that has arisen in a 
panel context, these tests can only be suggestive of possible aggregation 
problems. If we cannot reject the hypothesis of state heterogeneity in the 
aggregate context, the aggregate estimates are not consistent for the same 
reason as for the pooled estimates. 
As a standard for comparison (as suggested by Pesaran and Smith 
(1995)), we estimated the model separately for each state and then average 
coefficients across the group of states. In this procedure, though complete 
parameter heterogeneity is assumed, it ignores possible correlation of shocks 
across states, generating a possible simultaneous equation bias. The group 
mean estimates from this third procedure are otherwise consistent for samples 
large in both the time and cross-section dimension. Unfortunately, since the 
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number of states is relatively small in our sample, our mean group estimates 
will suffer from some small sample bias. 
Having explained our theoretical framework and our procedures for 
estimating the model, we now examine the key features of the data. 
3. Key Features of the Data 
 
In this section, we describe the data used in our analysis in terms of 
descriptive statistics. These statistics also suggest we should be concerned 
about the effects of cross-sectional heterogeneity in macro-economic models. 
From the model in the previous section, our focus is on four key endogenous 
variables (average weekly earnings, consumer price indices, total 
employment and the labour force) and two exogenous ones (the price of oil 
and the terms of trade).16. The wage and price variables are available for each 
capital city17 of the states, while the labour quantity data are measures for the 
state. Thus we will miss any changes that may have taken place between rural 
and urban Australia arising from relative real wage factors – however our 
guess is that these will be insignificant.  
                                                     
16 The average weekly earnings (AWE) series is taken from ABS Table 6302 and is for total 
earnings of all male employees. For further details, see 
http://www.abs.gov.au/Ausstats/abs@.nsf/Lookup/NT000096DA. We were forced to choose 
male earnings because state data on female employees are available only after December 1981 - 
however the correlation for total and male earnings after 1981 was greater than 99.5%. The price 
data is taken from ABS Table 6401-1b. For further details, see 
http://www.abs.gov.au/Ausstats/abs@.nsf/Lookup/NT00004DBE.  
The employment and labour force data is taken from ABS Table 6202 –H5. For further details, 
see http://www.abs.gov.au/Ausstats/abs@.nsf/Lookup/NT0000FB22. The oil price data was 
the West Texas crude oil price (converted to Australian dollars) which was sourced from 
http://www.economagic.com/em-cgi/data.exe/var/west-texas-crude-long. The external terms of 
trade was computed as the relative price of exports to imports and taken from ABS Table 
1364.0.15.003:29, also available from the ABS website. 
17 Data on the CPI for the Northern Territory and its capital Darwin are available only from 
September 1980, and so, to keep the panel balanced, we excluded this Territory from the analysis. 
Being relatively small (its employment share in the aggregate reached only 1% by 1999), its 
exclusion should not make too much difference. 
Our focus is on the period from September 1972 to March 1999. It 
covers a number of very significant events or aggregate shocks such as: the 
oil price hikes in 1974 and 1979; the wage explosions of 1973 and 1974 
based on collective bargaining decisions; the introduction of wage indexation 
from 1975 to 1981; the wages pause of 1982; the Prices and Incomes Accords 
from 1983 to 1995 between the peak union (ACTU) and the Labor 
government with its emphasis on the safety net for the lower-paid; the 
deregulation and liberalisation of financial markets epitomised by the floating 
(and subsequent depreciations) of the Australian dollar from 1983;  the 
growth in over-award payments leading to widespread enterprise bargaining 
in the 1990s; the major recessions in the early 1980s and early 1990s;  the 
decline in inflation cemented in by the introduction in 1994 of explicit 
inflation targeting by the Reserve Bank of Australia; and the Asian financial 
crisis from 1997 to 1998. 
National aggregates for wages and prices showed a positive but 
declining trend over the sample representing the general fall in inflation. The 
real wage grew by an average of 0.26% per quarter, and in total over the 27 
years by 27.2%. Consistent with the fall in inflation, wage and price growth 
rates exhibited declining variance. This is particularly evident for wages after 
1981, which might be explained in part by the Accords between the ACTU 
and Labor governments18. National employment and labour force measures 
are based on the monthly Labour Force Survey, and they had positive trends 
that may have shifted down marginally in the 1990s. Apart from cyclical and 
seasonal phenomena, their growth rates seemed to retain a consistent shape 
over the period. 
                                                     
18 However there is another compelling explanation. The wages series is for average weekly 
earnings, that is average gross before-tax earnings, and was affected by the proportions of full-
time, part-time, casual, junior and overtime employment. As a consequence, this data does display 
substantial seasonality and will also be driven by the business cycle. Prior to August 1981 it was 
based on payroll tax returns, and after that on a survey of employer units. Since companies with a 
small number of employees did not pay payroll tax, the high variance of the earlier segment 
reflects larger company employment practices (such as the greater use of overtime). To deal with 
this, we treat the seasonality components of average weekly earnings as different for the two 
periods.  
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Our state analysis may be worth conducting if there were some 
significant differences in the experiences of the states relative to the national 
aggregate. Figures 1 to 4 and Tables 1 (and 2) present graphs and basic 
statistics of the deviations in log levels (and growth rates) of each of the 
seven states from the national aggregate for four variables.19   
The deviations of mean wage and price levels for all states are 
statistically significant, though the deviations of mean growth rates are not. 
This suggests different local factors are at work (eg. state taxes, geographical 
distance etc.), but the changes on average and thus in the long run, may 
largely be driven by national factors. Queensland (QLD) exhibits significant 
relative skewness in wage levels and growth, and Tasmania (TAS) in wage 
growth. Victoria (VIC) shows significant negative relative kurtosis in wage 
levels, while South Australia (SA), TAS and Australian Capital Territory 
(ACT) suffer this (positively) in wage growth. For deviations of prices 
growth, New South Wales (NSW), Western Australia (WA), TAS and ACT 
have significant (and positive for all but NSW) skewness and (positive) 
kurtosis. These higher moment results provide additional evidence to support 
the notion that there are important differences in wage and price processes 
across the cities and through time.  
The significant deviations of mean employment and labour force 
levels merely indicate the varying sizes of the states. The deviations of the 
growth rates are largely associated with population migration within the 
country, and there have been significant relative gains in QLD and WA, and 
losses in SA. The distributions over time of relative employment levels in 
NSW, VIC, TAS and the ACT (and for the labour force in the last three) were 
significantly skewed (negatively for all but the first). The levels of both 
showed negative kurtosis for VIC, QLD and SA. The growths of both were 
significantly positively skewed for TAS, while the ACT suffered negative 
skewness for labour force growth. This is further evidence that the stochastic 
                                                     
19 Here the test is conducted on the deviations of state series from national data. Although we will 
show that the data in levels is nonstationary, one may also argue that  if both (a state series and the 
national series) are I(1), then the deviation may turn out to be I(0). 
processes for labour quantities differ significantly across states and through 
time.  
To get a deeper understanding of the differences across states for the 
four variables, we conducted analysis of variance tests for common means 
and variances across states and/or time for a panel of each. In Table 3, the 
results for these tests are reported. For the growth rates of wages and prices, 
the hypothesis of equal means across states cannot be rejected, however, the 
equality of means for the growth rates of employment and labour force can be 
rejected.  If we consider the time means, our result is uniform: we are always 
able to reject the null hypothesis of equality of means through time for all the 
series under consideration. For the growth rate of prices, we cannot reject the 
equality of variance across states. The failure to reject the equality of 
variances across states for prices only may be explained by the relatively high 
degree of integration of goods markets across Australia. For the labour 
market, variances differ significantly across states for growth rates of wages, 
employment and the labour force. These tests imply that there are important 
state-specific effects impacting on our labour market variables. Overall, we 
conclude that there is likely to be  extra useful information in panels of state-
wise components of labour market variables.  
Given the time series dimension in our data, it is important to check 
the non-stationarity properties of the various series. We discuss these issues 
in the next section. 
4. Testing for Panel Unit Roots and Cointegration 
 
This section is divided into two sub-sections: sub-section 1 analyzes the 
procedure for testing for the presence of a panel unit root along with the 
results for each of the variables in our model. Subsection IV.2 discusses the 
case of panel cointegration.  
4.1 Panel Unit Root Tests 
Early studies, which employed univariate unit root tests from Dickey and 
Fuller (1979, 1981, hereafter ADF) and Phillips and Perron (1988), very 
rarely rejected the unit root null hypothesis in favour of a stationary 
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alternative. These results, however, are typically attributed to the tests’ low 
power over short time spans of data. To increase the power of unit root tests, 
one solution is to allow for additional cross-sectional variation using panel 
methods. This approach has been used extensively to test for the presence of 
‘PPP’, growth and inflation convergence. We explore this approach in our 
paper by employing the panel data unit root test as proposed by Im, Pesaran 
and Shin (1995)20 – henceforth referred to as IPS - and estimate the following 
equation: 
itjit
k
1j
ijii1itiiiit xtx)1(x
i ε∆γδβββα∆ +∑+−++= −=−   
    (6) 
where i is the index for the N (=7 in our case) states, t indexes time over the 
sample period of length T (=107),  and x is the variable under consideration. 
In the above equation we have allowed the intercepts as well as the slope 
coefficients to differ across states. We have also included a heterogenous 
trend term in our equation (given by -βiδit). The inclusion of different 
intercepts accounts for possible unobserved heterogeneity across states. The 
lag-length was selected by the Campbell and Perron (1991) procedure starting 
with a maximum lag length of 16 and using the 10% critical value of 
asymptotic normal distribution to assess the significance of the last lag. The 
null and the alternative hypothesis under the IPS tests can be expressed as: 
H0 :  βi  =  β   =  0 
 H1 :  βi  <  0   for some i 
The above formulation makes it clear that the IPS test allows heterogeneity 
across cross-section units, i.e. states in our case.21  
                                                     
20 Bowman (1998) and Maddala and Wu (1999) provide evidence that the IPS test has more 
power than the Levin-Lin test for panel unit roots. 
21 By introducing cross-section variation information to unit root testing, there is a gain in power, 
but the hypothesis being tested in the panel context is somewhat different to that in the univariate 
tests – in the IPS test, the null of the panel unit root may be rejected on account of just one 
member of the cross-section, even if it could not be rejected without that member. Thus these 
panel tests are useful for testing the general applicability of a theoretical hypothesis, but they do 
not add power to the univariate methods that test hypothesis of specific applicability – only more 
powerful univariate tests can do that. 
Let tiT denote the individual t statistic for testing  βi = 0  in (6). The 
group mean of the n individual t-statistics, called the t-bar statistic, is defined 
as follows:  
where the lag length, ki, has been determined optimally. The standardized t-
bar statistic is defined as: 
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Tt is asymptotically distributed as a standard normal distribution. The mean 
and the variance adjustment terms in (7) depend on lag length and whether a 
constant and/or a trend are included in the model, and are given in IPS 
(1995).  
The results for the individual unit root along with that of panel unit 
root tests are presented in Table 4. We cannot reject the null hypothesis of a 
unit root in almost all the individual series with the exception of NSW’s 
employment (at the 5% level). The results from the panel unit root test reveal 
the same picture: for all the series we are able to do not reject the unit root in 
a panel context at the 5% level with the exception of the employment series. 
From these results, we shall take the cautious route, and assume that all of our 
four variables are integrated of order one.  
4.2 Panel Cointegration Tests 
As in the univariate testing of unit roots, the power of the single equation 
approach to cointegration is low and, as with our unit root testing, we shall 
appeal to the additional power delivered by the panel approach. If the 
coefficients in the cointegrating relationship were known a priori rather than 
having to be estimated, the Levin and Lin (1992) procedure could be applied 
to the estimated error variables in a panel framework. However, just as 
Dickey-Fuller critical values are not applicable to generated residuals from a 
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cointegrating regression, Levin and Lin critical values are (usually) 
inappropriate in a panel context. Furthermore, as Pedroni (2001) notes, while 
in the single series case the dependency of the residuals on the distributional 
properties of the estimated coefficients in the spurious regression can be 
accounted for by simply altering the critical values, the effect can be harder to 
remove in a panel because of the cross-sectional dimension to the structure of 
the residuals. The effect of this dependency hinges crucially on the alternative 
hypothesis. Consider a homogeneous panel: 
e + xt +  +  = y itititiit βδγα +      
    (8) 
In the above equation, although we allow for unobserved state heterogeneity, 
we capture this only by the presence of a different intercept term (αi). The 
term γt captures the presence of aggregate shocks or the time dummy, 
whereas the term t allows for the presence of a heterogenous trend across 
states. We estimated the above equation both with a trend term and without 
it.22  We also estimated equation (8) in two cases: in one case γt = 0 (without 
time dummy model), and in the other where γt ≠ 0 (with time dummy model). 
In (8), we have assumed that the cointegrating vector, β, is the same across 
different cross-sectional units (ie the states). Pedroni shows a 
superconsistency-type result whereby the asymptotic distributions of unit root 
tests are invariant to whether the residuals are known or estimated. However, 
in the more general heterogeneous panel 
e + xt +  +  = y itiititiit βδγα +      
    (9) 
where the cointegrating relationship (in terms of βi) can differ between 
individual panellists, the standard panel unit root test statistic does not 
converge, with serious implications for the test. 
Pedroni (1999, 2001) develops three tests of the null hypothesis that 
the eit are nonstationary: Z ˆ NTρ  based on residual autoregressions, and Z t ˆ NTρ  
based on a t test with corresponding to an Augmented Dickey-Fuller and the 
                                                     
22 Note that the trend term is different to a time dummy. 
other to a Phillips-Perron type test. Pedroni (1999) refers to the t statistic as 
the panel-cointegration statistic when the slope coefficient in the 
cointegrating relationship is the same for the cross-sectional units, and as the 
group statistic when the slope differs across the units. The group statistic is 
based on the average of individual statistics. 
We tested for panel cointegration in the heterogeneous model 
allowing the cointegrating vector slope terms and the intercept term to differ 
between individual panel members. We also tested for separate time trends 
and for time dummies to account for aggregate shocks. As in the case of the 
unit root test, we started with k = kmax = 9 and used the 10% critical value of 
asymptotic normal distribution to assess the significance of the last lag.  
If our panel cointegration tests reject the null of no cointegration 
amongst a particular set of variables, we used the estimated errors in the 
context of a dynamic error correction model. Though the least squares 
estimator of the cointegrating vector is known to be superconsistent (so that 
the two step estimator of the error correction model has the same asymptotics 
as when the cointegrating vector is known), its asymptotic distribution suffers 
from nuisance parameters arising from regressor endogeneity and serial 
correlation of the errors. To obtain unbiased estimates of the cointegrating 
vector, we used the fully modified OLS (FM-OLS) estimator of Phillips and 
Hansen (1990) which introduces non-parametric corrections for the nuisance 
problems.  
Having established with our panel unit root tests (in the previous sub-
section) that we cannot reject non-stationarity for the levels of our four 
variables, we present in the next section our error correction models results. 
We began by testing for the cointegrating vectors that arise from our long run 
hypotheses of the labour market, and then if they could not be rejected, we 
estimated a dynamic error correction model based on the theoretical 
framework discussed in Section II.  
5. Estimation Results and Forecast Performance  
 
We begin in sub-section V.1 with the long-run results from the first step 
estimation of the two conjectured cointegrating vectors, (5) and (6), using the 
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panel cointegration tests, and the associated FM-OLS estimators. Sub-section 
V.2 presents the results for the second step estimation of the short-run 
dynamic model in (1)–(4) in three ways, namely the pooled, unrestricted 
aggregate and mean-group estimates procedures. Sub-section V.3 conducts a 
forecasting exercise for the three procedures.  
 
5.1 Panel Cointegration and FM-OLS Results for (5) and (6) 
The results of applying the panel cointegration test (Pedroni (1999)) are given 
in Table 5. The first 3 rows report test statistics for the model with a common 
slope coefficient whereas the next 3 represent the case for heterogeneous 
slope coefficients. We present the results for the most general model: model 
allowing for time dummies and with and without a trend term. However, our 
results are more or less invariant to alternative specifications.23 There is clear 
evidence of cointegration in this framework since all the test statistics are 
significant at standard confidence levels.  
Table 6 reports the unbiased individual FM-OLS estimates of the 
cointegrating vectors, as well as the group FM-OLS estimates24. The 
asymptotic covariances are estimated individually for each member i of the 
cross section using the Newey-West estimator. For the lag length of the band 
width, we employ the data-dependent scheme recommended in Newey and 
West (1994), which is to set the lag truncation to the nearest integer given by 
K = 4*(T/100)2/9, where T is the number of time observations.  
With regard to (5), we infer that the elasticity of the state CPI is 
significantly different from one (and zero) for all the states, except NSW and 
QLD. This is not surprising because there are different state taxes affecting 
the real product wage. The employment variable exerts a significant negative 
impact in all but WA. However, the elasticity estimates are significantly 
different from one (and zero) for the CPI and from zero for employment in 
                                                     
23 Detailed results are available on request. 
24 See Phillips and Hansen (1990) for properties of the FM-OLS estimator. For the group FM-
OLS estimator, see Pedroni (2000). 
the panel context. When we include time dummies in our model, the state 
CPI remains significantly different from one and zero, but the employment 
parameter loses some significance (6%). The deterministic trend is positive 
(and only insignificant for SA and TAS) partly reflecting technological 
progress. 
For the unemployment gap estimates of (6), each state’s elasticity of 
the nominal wage on (long run) unemployment is estimated to be positive 
(which is not as predicted by the wage curve hypothesis), but is significant 
only for NSW, QLD and TAS. The group estimate, without time dummies 
included, is significantly positive. However when time dummies are included 
(effectively removing aggregate shocks), the wage elasticity becomes 
significant with the expected negative sign. In general, the price elasticity 
estimates are not significant, and it would appear that it is the nominal and 
not the real wage that matters for long term unemployment. However it may 
be that wages are compared to a nominal benefit rate instead. After 
accounting for wages and prices, the trend in long run unemployment is 
significantly negative (apart from ACT).  
In summary, our results suggest that the real wage-marginal 
productivity relationship appears to hold in the long run, while the wage 
curve hypothesis gets support provided aggregate shocks are purged from the 
data. 
5.2  Estimates of the Dynamic Model  
The short run dynamic model, (1)-(4), was estimated by non-linear least 
squares, which is equivalent to SUR. For our pooled panel procedure, 28 
equations were estimated simultaneously, with cross-equation restrictions 
applied so that each elasticity is the same across states. There were 107 
observations for each variable in each of the 7 states. After accounting for 2 
lags25 on all variables in the model and some missing observations, we ended 
                                                     
25 For the dynamic model, the maximum number of lags on all variables had to be set to 2. With 3 
lags, the iterative procedure for estimating the model could not reach convergence. In Table 7, the 
test for setting the second lags of all variables to zero rejected the restriction at less than 1%. 
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up with 91 usable observations. No estimates of seasonal dummies are 
reported though most were highly significant.  
The results are shown in Table 7. The pooled panel estimates (with 
standard errors) for each of (1)-(4), where all parameters are constrained to be 
equal across states, are shown in the 2nd and 5th columns. For the wage 
growth equation, only 4 parameters are significant (and 3 at less than 5%). 
These are the parameters for the first error correction effect from (5), the 
second lag of wage change, the second lag of price change and of oil price 
change. If the gap between the wage and labour productivity increases by 
10%, wage change in the next period will decline by 2.05%. This persistence 
of this process will be directly influenced by the lagged wage parameter, 
estimated to be 0.175. The lagged price change parameter arises largely from 
expected inflation effects, and its estimated value of 0.973 is not significantly 
different from 1. The negative oil price change effect (significant at 10%) 
suggests that wage setters expect a recession impact from oil price increases. 
Since the change in lagged unemployment was not significant, there was no 
‘speed limit’ effect on wage or price inflation (or a first difference form of the 
wage curve hypothesis). 
The significant parameters in the price inflation equation are for the 
unemployment gap, the wage mark-up, own lags that deliver persistence, the 
second lag of employment change (with a negative sign, but only 10% 
significance), the second lag of the terms of trade growth and oil price 
inflation. If the level of unemployment rises above its estimated long run 
value by 10% (equivalent to about 0.7% in unemployment in 1999), inflation 
would fall by 0.09%. The wage mark-up occurs after 1 lag, and the parameter 
is modest in size (0.07). An improvement in the terms of trade raises inflation 
after 2 periods, consistent with our interpretation that the Australian terms of 
trade are driven positively by global output. The net effect of higher oil prices 
is to raise inflation as an expected cost-push factor. 
Employment change is driven significantly by a constant, negatively 
by the first lag of real wage change (since the absolute value of the 
parameters for the nominal wage and price changes are not significantly 
different), and also by the second lag of the nominal wage change. The first 
lag in the change in unemployment very significantly reduces employment 
growth (with a parameter between -0.206 and –0.189). This is consistent with 
our interpretation of a short run aggregate demand factor operating through a 
multiplier on employment. The terms of trade has a significant (at 10%) and 
positive effect on employment after 2 periods, similar to prices, and 
consistent with an external demand-driven interpretation. The second lag of 
the oil price is significant (at 5%) and negative, and is likely to be due to a 
rise in production costs.  
Labour force growth is explained by a constant, negatively by lagged 
nominal wage growth, positively by lagged price growth, positively by the 
first lag of employment growth, negatively by its own lags, and negatively by 
the terms of trade and oil prices. The negative wage and positive inflation 
effects as well as the negative terms of trade effect may be surprising. Labour 
force participation might fall after a rise in the real wage because it is 
recognised that employment opportunities will be reduced. This means that 
the discouraged worker hypothesis, working via expected future employment, 
dominates the direct incentive effects on labour supply of a wage rise. The 
employment and labour force signs are also consistent with the discouraged 
worker hypothesis. The negative terms of trade effect might arise because 
exports are not relatively labour-intensive, though this is not consistent with 
the positive effect on employment discussed in the previous paragraph. 
Higher oil prices reduce labour force participation because they will reduce 
employment opportunities, as established in the employment equation. 
The results of our first approach to test for state heterogeneity are 
given in columns 3 and 6 in Table 7, which are based on the estimates from 
the dynamic pooled panel model of 28 equations. We ran a series of pooled 
regressions in which each parameter alone was allowed to vary across states, 
and then we tested for equality of those 7 state parameters. A strongly 
significant fixed effect exists only in the labour force equation, and very 
weakly in the price equation. For the wage equation, of the 4 significant 
parameters, only 2 differ across states. For the price equation, all significant 
parameters appear to differ across states (at 10% or less). In the employment 
equation, 3 out of the 8 significant parameters exhibit state heterogeneity, and 
in the labour force equation, we have 5 out of 10. In each equation, there are 
a number of instances where a restricted parameter was not significantly 
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different from 0, but the parameter was significantly different across states. 
From our first approach, we conclude that state heterogeneity certainly exists. 
Our second approach to the state heterogeneity problem involved 
estimating the same structural model with aggregated data (reducing the 
system from 28 to 4 equations). We report the parameter estimates for this 
aggregate national macro procedure in Table 8. The parameter estimates are 
not much different to those reported in columns 2 and 5 in Table 7. For each 
parameter in question, we ran a separate model regression including the 
associated state variables, and test to see if these are jointly significant. The 
results are in columns 3 and 6 of Table 8. In the aggregate wage growth 
equation, for each of the 3 significant parameters on lagged endogenous 
variables, the inclusion of the relevant state variables cannot be rejected (at 
10% or less). For the aggregate inflation equation, state variables make a 
difference for only 1 out of 5 relevant variables, and that is the own second 
lag. For employment growth, we have 3 out of 5 relevant variables, and for 
the labour force, 6 out of 8. These results suggest that aggregation is not 
serious when modelling price inflation, but may be of concern for models of 
wages, employment and the labour force.  
The results from the tests for state homogeneity indicate that we can 
reject the null hypothesis of state homogeneity in both the pooled as well as 
the aggregate national context. Therefore the pooled as well as the aggregate 
estimates are not consistent in the presence of state heterogeneity. Given 
heterogeneity, and following  Pesaran and Smith (1995), we also compute the 
mean group estimates of our dynamic model by running  the model separately 
for each state and then averaging coefficients across the group of states. Here, 
the standard errors of the parameter estimates are the square root of averages 
of the cross-section variance of the estimates.  
The results from the mean group estimates procedure are given in 
columns 2 and 4 of Table 9. Compared to our pooled procedure (as reported 
in Table 7) or the aggregate procedure (as reported in Table 8), we note that 
that for the wage growth equation, several coefficients of the variables are 
significant. These include the second lag of wage changes, the first and 
second lag of both price and employment changes as well as both lags of 
terms of trade and oil price changes. For the price equation, the significant 
parameters are the unemployment gap, the wage mark-up, own lags that 
deliver persistence, the second lag of employment change (with a positive 
sign), both lags of the terms of trade growth and the first lag of oil price 
inflation. The wage mark-up occurs after 1 lag and continues in the second 
lag, and the sum of the two lags of the wage mark-up is 0.09. An 
improvement in the terms of trade raises inflation after 1 period, whereas the 
effect of higher oil prices is to raise inflation as an expected cost-push factor. 
Employment change is driven significantly by the terms of trade after 2 
periods. An increase in the change in nominal wage significantly reduces the 
change in employment (the first lag is significant at one percent level), as 
well by the lag of changes in unemployment. The equation for the labour 
force growth is positively affected by the first lag of price growth, positively 
by the lagged employment growth, negatively by its own lags and negatively 
by the first lag of wage growth. 
Knowing that all three procedures will suffer from bias in some form, 
we now present the results from our out-of-sample forecasting exercise for all 
three estimated procedures. 
 
5.3  Forecasting Performance of the Three Procedures  
This sub-section discusses the forecasting performance of the pooled, 
aggregate and mean-group estimates procedures. We computed twelve-step 
ahead forecasts based on a series of rolling regressions. First, we estimated 
the model until 1996:1 (95th observation) and then used the estimated 
coefficients to forecast for the next 12 periods. We then re-estimated the 
model by adding one more observation and forecasted the model for the next 
eleven steps and so on. The computed statistics are based on the number of 
available observations for each step, 1 to 12. 
To compare the three procedures, we first aggregated the forecast 
results for the pooled and mean group estimates procedures. We evaluated the 
forecasting performance in two ways: by the root mean square error (RMSE) 
and by using Theil’s U statistic. Theil’s U statistic is a ratio of the root mean 
square error for the model to the root mean square error for a naïve forecast 
of no change. This is preferred to RMSE because it is independent of the scale 
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of the variable in question. Values of Theil's U  less than 1 indicate a 
technique is better than using a naïve forecast.  
We summarize the results from our first forecasting exercise in 
Figure 5. The pooled procedure dominates the other two for each variable at 
all steps less than 12 in terms of the RMSE. The pooled procedure performs 
better than a naïve forecast of no change (i.e. Theil’s U <1) for employment 
and the labour force at all forecast steps less than 12. For wages, it performs 
better for about half the number of steps (particularly between 6 and 9 steps), 
but for prices it does only as well at the 4th quarter step. The other two 
procedures never do better than a naïve forecast for any of the endogenous 
variables for steps less than 12. Beyond a 2 step horizon, the mean group 
procedure performs in most cases better than the aggregate one except for the 
price growth equation.  
In a second forecasting exercise, we compared the state forecast 
performances for each variable using the pooled procedure and from the 
separate state regressions of the model. We took the difference in the Theil U 
statistics for these. These are presented in Figure 6. Overall the pooled 
procedure is preferred, although understandably not always for NSW (being 
the largest state entity). 
We conclude that our original pooled panel procedure is preferred to 
the aggregate macro procedure and to the mean group and individual results 
of the independent state models. Thus even though state heterogeneity exists, 
the gain from the simultaneous estimation of the 28 equation model exceeds 
the costs of ignoring parameter heterogeneity in terms of making out-of 
sample forecasts.  
 
6. Conclusions 
 
The objective of this paper was to consider whether cross-section information 
improves the information content of dynamic macroeconometric modelling of 
the Australian labour market. We took a disaggregation by state of key labour 
market variables. The resulting macroeconometric panel was far longer in the 
time than the cross-section dimension, in contrast to microeconometric 
panels.  
Using modern methods of panel cointegration with a two-step 
procedure, we estimated dynamic error correction models for the Australian 
state labour markets. For the long run relationships, we tested two models: a 
labour demand-side relation for which the real wage should equal the 
marginal product of labour; and an unemployment relation based on the wage 
curve hypothesis. Both models yielded cointegrating vectors. The demand-
side model had the correct signs and significance in all the tests (ie univariate, 
panel unit root, with and without fixed state and time effects) using FM-OLS 
estimation. The wage curve hypothesis suggests a negative relationship 
between unemployment and wages, and this could only be detected when 
time dummies were included, that is when aggregate effects had been 
factored out.  
The short-run dynamic model delivered a significant expectations-
augmented Phillips curve in wages and prices, with the latter exhibiting 
stickiness and including mark-up, and external demand and supply-side 
effects. The employment growth equations showed significant short-term 
Keynesian demand-side features through unemployment and the terms of 
trade growth, as well as supply-side effects through oil prices. Labour force 
growth exhibited migration differences across states, and the estimates also 
supported the discouraged worker hypothesis. Decisions to participate in the 
labour force appeared to depend on what was perceived to influence 
employment opportunities. 
Our tests for state heterogeneity suggest that it certainly existed in 
our sample. In the dynamic pooled panel model, we detected fixed effects for 
quantity variables, as well as differential slope effects for many of the 
regressors in each equation. Further, when using aggregate data with the 
same structural model, we showed that the inclusion of state-level data was 
statistically important. This was particularly true for our labour market 
variables, though not so for inflation. We conclude then that state 
heterogeneity in labour markets does exist. This is an important result 
because it is known that the state homogeneity assumption implicit in pooling 
or aggregating dynamic panels is not innocuous – significant heterogeneity 
may create serious biases in estimates.  One resolution of that problem may 
be to estimate state relationships individually, and then obtain state averages 
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of the parameter estimates. Two problems may arise in this context. First, the 
number of component states may be quite small (as in the case of Australia, 
but probably not the US) leading to small sample biases, and second this 
procedure assumes state independence, which is not likely.  
With each procedure suffering from some bias, our way of selecting 
amongst them was to see which performs best in out-of-sample forecasting 
tests. Our results for Australian labour markets show that the pooled model is 
definitely the most preferred model even though by pooling it ignores the 
parameter aspects of state heterogeneity. 
Data is usually available for much longer time spans and many more 
variables at the national level than at the state level. Our results are 
sufficiently promising to encourage government agencies around the world to 
provide more detailed data at the state level. Much remains unexplained, and 
this paper as only begun to address the important issue of comparing the 
performance of macroeconometric models using national aggregate data with 
those using disaggregated data. Even though the particular model that we 
worked with may be improved upon, we conjecture that our conclusions on 
aggregation will not easily be over-turned. Although our empirical model is 
applied to Australian data, our result that the pooling procedure is preferred 
to aggregation and group means may well hold, or at least should be tested, 
for many other countries.  
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TABLE 1: Descriptive Statistics for Level Deviations from National Data, 1972:3-1999:1 
 
  Probability Values (and Sign) of 
Deviations from National Data Mean Mean Skewness 
 
Kurtosis 
 
Wages  
ACT (Canberra) .116 .00 .94 .90 
NSW (Sydney) .035 .00 .21 .21 
QLD (Brisbane) -.043 .00 .01 (-) .48 
SA (Adelaide) -.067 .00 .28 .29 
TAS (Hobart) -.065 .00 .38 .28 
VIC (Melbourne) -.013 .00 .38 .01 (-) 
 WA (Perth) .010 .00 .56 .95 
Prices  
ACT (Canberra) .009 .00 .83 .62 
NSW (Sydney) -.004 .00 .13 .21 
QLD (Brisbane) .012 .00 .94 .12 
SA (Adelaide) .011 .00 .07 .56 
TAS (Hobart) .011 .00 .78 .07 
VIC (Melbourne) -.003 .00 .77 .14 
 WA (Perth) -.007 .00 .49 .65 
Employment  
ACT -4.05 .00 .02 (-) .11 
NSW -1.07 .00 .02 (+) .18 
QLD -1.83 .00 .65 .02 (-) 
SA -2.45 .00 .49 .12 
TAS -3.64 .00 .01 (-) .51 
VIC -1.33 .00 .01 (-) .02 (-) 
 WA -2.38 .00 .61 .04 (-) 
Labour Force  
ACT -4.07 .00 .05 (-) .06 
NSW -1.07 .00 .13 .09 
QLD -1.82 .00 .80 .02 (-) 
SA -2.44 .00 .45 .06 
TAS -3.64 .00 .00 (-) .62 
VIC -1.34 .00 .27 .02 (-) 
 WA -2.38 .00 .26 .04 (-) 
Note: The p-values indicate the strength of evidence against the existence of a zero mean, no skewness or kurtosis. 
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TABLE 2: Descriptive Statistics for Growth Deviations from National Data, 1972:3-1999:1 
  Probability Values (and Sign) of 
Deviations from National Data Mean Mean Skewness Kurtosis 
Growth in Wages  
ACT (Canberra) .00028 .92 .06 .00 (+) 
NSW (Sydney) .00004 .96 .22 .23 
QLD (Brisbane) -.00014 .92 .01 (-) .42 
SA (Adelaide) .00018 .91 .93 .04 (+) 
TAS (Hobart) .00057 .79 .03 (-) .03 (+) 
VIC (Melbourne) -.00006 .95 .53 .44 
 WA (Perth) .00022 .88 .23 .50 
Growth in Prices  
ACT (Canberra) -.00013 .78 .00 (+) .00 (+) 
NSW (Sydney) .00001 .96 .01 (-) .00 (+) 
QLD (Brisbane) -.00006 .87 .51 .31 
SA (Adelaide) .00021 .58 .55 .02 (+) 
TAS (Hobart) -.00007 .87 .00 (+) .00 (+) 
VIC (Melbourne) .00008 .77 .52 .72 
 WA (Perth) -.00011 .82 .00 (+) .00 (+) 
Growth in  
ACT .0014 .47 .90 .62 
NSW -.0009 .08 .85 .57 
QLD .0029 .00 .94 .96 
SA -.0018 .00 .93 .54 
TAS -.0022 .14 .03 (+) .46 
VIC -.0008 .14 .19 .55 
 WA .0021 .01 .38 .71 
Growth in Labour  
ACT .0015 .41 .03 (-) .23 
NSW -.0009 .06 .40 .63 
QLD .0030 .00 .38 .74 
SA -.0017 .03 .37 .92 
TAS -.0018 .21 .02 (+) .60 
VIC -.0009 .12 .34 .96 
 WA .0020 .01 .38 .73 
Note: The p-values indicate the strength of evidence against the existence of a zero mean, no skewness or kurtosis. 
TABLE 3: Analysis of Variance for State Panels 
 Probability Values  
Variable State Means Time Means State Variances 
Growth in Wages .99 .00 .00 
Growth in Prices .99 .00 .82 
Growth in Employment .00 .00 .00 
Growth in Labour Force .00 .00 .00 
Note: These p-values measure the strength of evidence for whether the means across states and through time and the variance across 
states differ significantly.  
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Table 4:  Results from Individual and Panel Unit Root Tests 
(trend included) 
 
 Individual Unit Root  Tests Panel Unit 
Variable Lag Length, ki Test-Statistics  
Wages  
Canberra (ACT) 6 -2.05 -- 
Sydney 8 -1.35 -- 
Brisbane (QLD) 8 -1.64 -- 
Adelaide (SA) 8 -1.22 -- 
Hobart (TAS) 7 -1.95 -- 
Melbourne (VIC) 8 -0.62 -- 
 Perth (WA) 4 -1.66 -- 
Group   1.992 
Prices    
Canberra (ACT) 7 0.14 -- 
Sydney 7 -0.03 -- 
Brisbane (QLD) 7 -0.49 -- 
Adelaide (SA) 5 -0.20 -- 
Hobart (TAS) 7 -0.51 -- 
Melbourne (VIC) 7 -0.11 -- 
 Perth (WA) 9 -0.32 -- 
Group   6.157 
Employment    
ACT  0 -1.32 -- 
NSW  8 -4.00** -- 
QLD  8 -3.05 -- 
SA  6 -2.02 -- 
TAS  7 -2.49 -- 
VIC  8 -2.80 -- 
 WA  4 -3.06 -- 
Group   -1.861** 
Labour Force    
ACT  8 0.14 -- 
NSW  8 -2.31 -- 
QLD  2 -2.05 -- 
SA  8 -1.36 -- 
TAS  8 -0.95 -- 
VIC  5 -1.97 -- 
 WA  4 -1.57 -- 
Group   2.209 
Notes: Columns 2 and 3 summarize the results of univariate (ADF) unit root tests. The null is the non-stationarity of 
the time series. Critical values for the univariate unit root tests are taken from MacKinnon (1991). For 107 
observations, the critical values at 1% and 5%  levels of significance are –4.05 and –3.45, respectively. Column 4 
reports the results of the panel unit root test. The critical (standard Normal) values for the panel unit root tests at the 
1% and 5%  levels of significance are –2.325 and –1.645, respectively.** denotes rejection of the unit root null at the 
5% level.
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Table 5: Results from Panel Cointegration Tests  
 
Panel 
Cointegration 
Statistics 
Equation 5 Equation 6 
 Without Trend With Trend Without Trend With Trend 
Panel Rho  -10.74 -10.14 -9.45 -8.87 
Panel PP  -7.82 -8.62 -7.14 -7.95 
Panel ADF  -12.10 -16.29 -9.08 -10.71 
     
Group Rho  -11.96 -10.34 -9.01 -8.02 
Group PP  -9.54 -9.57 -7.77 -7.92 
Group ADF  -15.53 -19.47 -11.72 -12.78 
 
Notes: All of these test statistics are standard normal distributed. Sufficiently large negative values lead to a rejection of 
the null hypothesis that the series are not cointegrated  (the critical value is -2.326 at the 1% level).      
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Table 6: Individual and Group FM-OLS estimates of the Cointegrating Vectors 
Equation: 
 
Dependent variable:  
(5) 
  
        Wages, Wit 
(6) 
 
Unemployment rate, LFit-EMit 
State CPI Employment Constant Trend Wage CPI Constant Trend 
ACT (Canberra) 1.16 
(20.1)  
-0.53 
(-4.26) *** 
3.36 
(9.44)*** 
0.002 
(3.79)***
0.11 
(0.18) 
-0.43 
(-0.67) 
-1.7 
(-1.69)* 
0.01 
(2.47)** 
NSW 
(Sydney) 
1.03 
(34.1) 
-0.74 
(-5.02) *** 
6.65 
(6.70)*** 
0.003 
(4.33)***
2.83 
(3.72) *** 
-1.46 
(-1.73) * 
-11.77 
(12.15)*** 
-0.02 
(-6.74)*** 
QLD (Brisbane) 1.02 
(27.3) 
-0.89 
(-4.38) *** 
6.46 
(5.41)*** 
0.006 
(4.04)***
1.31 
(2.39) ** 
0.13 
(0.21)  
-9.85 
(-13.10)*** 
-0.02 
(-6.68)*** 
SA (Adelaide) 1.12 
(38.1)*** 
-0.42 
(-3.04) ** 
3.81 
(5.23)*** 
0.000 
(0.36) 
1.09 
(1.55) 
0.20 
(0.25)  
-8.76 
(-11.59)*** 
-0.01 
(-5.95)*** 
TAS (Hobart) 1.27 
(34.3) *** 
-0.88 
(-5.37) *** 
4.79 
(6.90) *** 
-0.01 
(-1.34) 
0.91 
(2.34) **  
0.28 
(0.56)  
-8.30 
(-18.42)*** 
-0.01 
(-5.42)*** 
VIC (Melbourne) 1.12 
(35.7) *** 
-0.43 
(-2.99) ** 
4.23 
(4.82) *** 
0.001 
(1.90)* 
1.12 
(1.29) 
-0.29 
(-0.29)  
-7.45 
(-7.72)*** 
-0.01 
(-2.13)** 
 WA (Perth) 1.11 
(30.7) * 
-0.28 
(-1.36)  
2.88 
(2.93) *** 
0.002 
(1.68)* 
0.32 
(0.53) 
1.29 
(1.87) * 
-8.86 
(-12.78)*** 
-0.02 
(-8.78)*** 
Group – without 
time dummies 
1.12 
(83.2) *** 
-0.60 
(-9.99) *** 
4.60 
(15.66) *** 
0.002 
(5.58)***
1.10 
(4.54) *** 
-0.04 
(0.07)  
-8.10 
(-29.27)*** 
-0.01 
(-12.56)*** 
Group – with time 
dummies 
0.57 
(4.79)** 
-0.03 
(-1.95) * 
-0.04 
(-6.95) *** 
0.00 
(0.59) 
-0.76 
(-3.19) *** 
-0.48 
(-0.72)  
0.04 
(3.05)*** 
-0.00 
(-1.28) 
Notes: The numbers in parenthesis are the t-statistics for the null hypothesis that the coefficient of log of price is one and that of employment or labour force or unemployment rate is zero. *** denotes rejection at 
1% level, ** at 5% level and * rejection at 10% level respectively. 
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Table 7:  Pooled SUR Estimates of the Dynamic System (1)-(4) with 2 lags 
Parameter Panel Estimates  
(Std Errors) 
State Equality 
Test 
Parameter Panel Estimates 
(Std Errors) 
State Equality 
Test 
Wages (1)  
 
Prices (2)  
 
c1 0.004(0.005)   c2 0.001(0.001)  # 
ec11 -0.205(0.067)*** # ec21 0.019(0.015)   
ec12 -0.007(0.014)   ec22 -0.009(0.003)*** ### 
w11 0.061(0.080)  ### w21 0.070(0.021)*** ### 
w12 0.175(0.049)***  w22 0.027(0.025)   
p11 -0.052(0.287)  ### p21 0.296(0.082)*** # 
p12 0.973(0.266)***  p22 0.463(0.058)*** ### 
em11 -0.031(0.139)  ### em21 -0.002(0.065)   
em12 -0.029(0.124)   em22 -0.165(0.087)* ## 
lf11 0.055(0.152)  ### lf21 0.005(0.076)  ## 
lf12 0.053(0.137)  ## lf22 0.112(0.077)  ### 
tot11 -0.019(0.061)  ## tot21 0.017(0.027)   
tot12 0.056(0.062)  # tot22 0.074(0.030)** # 
op11 -0.002(0.008)  ## op21 0.010(0.003)*** ### 
op12 -0.012(0.007)* ### op22 -0.006(0.002)*** ### 
Average R2 0.43  Average R2 0.66  
      
Employment 
(3)   
 Labour Force 
(4) 
  
c3 0.005(0.001)***  c4 -0.005(0.001)*** ### 
ec31 0.021(0.025)  ## ec41 -0.003(0.014)   
ec32 0.003(0.005)  ### ec42 -0.001(0.003)  ### 
w31 -0.066(0.027)** ## w41 -0.073(0.019)*** ### 
w32 -0.091(0.027)***  w42 -0.054(0.023)**  
p31 0.122(0.053)**  p41 0.250(0.045)*** ### 
p32 0.104(0.065)   p42 0.099(0.040)** ### 
em31 0.206(0.057)*** ## em41 0.189(0.044)***  
em32 0.071(0.070)  ### em42 0.051(0.047)  ### 
lf31 -0.189(0.065)***  lf41 -0.210(0.041)***  
lf32 -0.105(0.073)  ### lf42 -0.140(0.059)** ### 
tot31 -0.017(0.030)   tot41 -0.070(0.028)** # 
tot32 0.044(0.025)*  tot42 0.033(0.022)   
op31 -0.002(0.003)   op41 0.000(0.002)  ## 
op32 -0.009(0.005)** ### op42 -0.016(0.004)*** ### 
Average R2 0.18  Average R2 0.34  
 H0:All 2nd lag 
parameters=0 : χ2(24) 
 
=627***   
 
Note: The significance of the test statistic for a null hypothesis of zero for parameters is shown as *  at the 10% level, ** at 5%, and *** at 
1%. 
 #, ## and  ### indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively of evidence against the hypothesis that a parameter is 
equal across states in panel model estimations. 
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Table 8:  Estimates of the Unrestricted Aggregate SUR System (1)-(4) with 2 lags 
 
Parameter Panel Estimates  
(Std Errors) 
State 
Equality 
Test 
Parameter Panel Estimates 
(Std Errors) 
State Equality  
Test 
Wages (1)   Prices (2)   
c1 -0.006(0.006)  - c2 -0.002(0.002) - 
ec11 -0.236(0.077)*** @@@ ec21 0.047(0.023)**   
ec12 -0.006(0.000)  @@@ ec22 0.004(0.005)  
w11 0.073(0.109)   w21 0.013(0.032)  
w12 0.186(0.093)** @@ w22 0.065(0.027)**  @@@ 
p11 0.095(0.406)   p21 0.424(0.100)***  
p12 0.822(0.280)*** @ p22 0.355(0.081)*** @@@ 
em11 0.328(0.322)  @@@ em21 -0.074(0.140)  @@@ 
em12 0.500(0.393)   em22 0.176(0.141)  
lf11 -0.006(0.366)  @@@ lf21 -0.010(0.130)  @@@ 
lf12 -0.299(0.406)   lf22 0.015(0.156)   
tot11 -0.041(0.068)  - tot21 0.039(0.031)  - 
tot12 0.006(0.072)  - tot22 0.029(0.042) - 
op11 0.002(0.008)  - op21 0.011(0.004)*** - 
op12 -0.005(0.008) - op22 -0.006(0.004) - 
R2 0.70  R2 0.72  
      
Employment  
(3)   
 Labour Force 
(4) 
  
C3 0.005(0.002)** - c4 -0.001(0.002) - 
ec31 0.020(0.019)  @@@ ec41 0.000(0.000)   
ec32 0.011(0.005)**  @@@ ec42 -0.001(0.004)  @ 
w31 -0.082(0.038)**  w41 -0.091(0.038)**  
w32 -0.006(0.034) @@@ w42 -0.008(0.030) @@ 
p31 0.145(0.091) @@@ p41 0.218(0.091)** @@@ 
p32 0.074(0.080)   p42 0.010(0.079) @ 
em31 0.505(0.104)*** @@@ em41 0.423(0.129)*** @@@ 
em32 0.698(0.113)***  @@@ em42 0.307(0.108)***  @@@ 
lf31 -0.540(0.135)*** @@@ lf41 -0.544(0.164)*** @@ 
lf32 -0.841(0.117)***  @@@ lf42 -0.694(0.125)*** @ 
tot31 0.003(0.034)  - tot41 -0.031(0.042) - 
tot32 0.012(0.029) - tot42 -0.004(0.034)  - 
op31 -0.003(0.004)  - op41 -0.001(0.004)  - 
op32 -0.001(0.005) - op42 -0.004(0.003) - 
R2 0.62  R2 0.73  
 H0: All 2nd lag 
parameters=0: χ2(24)= 
 
 
544*** 
  
 
Note: The significance of the test statistic for a null hypothesis of zero for parameters is shown as *  at the 10% level, ** at 5%, and *** at 
1%. 
@,@@ and  @@@ indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively of evidence against the hypothesis that a parameter is 
equal across states in aggregate model estimations 
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 Table 9:  Mean Group Estimates of the Dynamic System (1)-(4) with 2 lags 
Parameter Panel Estimates  
(Std Errors) 
Parameter Panel Estimates 
(Std Errors) 
Wages (1)  Prices (2)  
c1 0.002(0.002)  c2 0.002(0.001)**  
ec11 -0.227(0.009)*** ec21 0.047(0.006)***  
ec12 0.006(0.002)***  ec22 0.000(0.001) 
w11 -0.051(0.041)  w21 0.020(0.007)*** 
w12 0.214(0.049)*** w22 0.073(0.014)***  
p11 0.381(0.113)***  p21 0.361(0.020)*** 
p12 0.594(0.093)*** p22 0.319(0.019)*** 
em11 0.312(0.075)***  em21 -0.073(0.051)  
em12 0.413(0.166)**  em22 0.146(0.052)*** 
lf11 -0.006(0.093)  lf21 0.047(0.046)  
lf12 -0.276(0.220)  lf22 -0.105(0.059)*  
tot11 0.056(0.033)*  tot21 0.034(0.008)***  
tot12 -0.057(0.027)**  tot22 0.067(0.011)*** 
op11 0.014(0.006)***  op21 0.012(0.001)*** 
op12 0.013(0.005)*** op22 0.001(0.002) 
Average R2 0.70 Average R2 0.64 
    
Employment  
(3)   
Labour Force (4)  
c3 0.003(0.003) c4 -0.003(0.001)* 
ec31 0.004(0.011)  ec41 0.000(0.000)  
ec32 0.009(0.003)***  ec42 -0.004(0.003)*  
w31 -0.051(0.012)*** w41 -0.066(0.019)*** 
w32 -0.013(0.023) w42 0.000(0.022) 
p31 0.083(0.088) p41 0.142(0.071)** 
p32 0.108(0.093)  p42 0.125(0.080) 
em31 0.238(0.061)*** em41 0.242(0.088)*** 
em32 0.417(0.079)***  em42 0.253(0.039)***  
lf31 -0.305(0.071)*** lf41 -0.399(0.090)*** 
lf32 -0.597(0.087)***  lf42 -0.569(0.057)*** 
tot31 0.003(0.014)  tot41 -0.012(0.011) 
tot32 0.023(0.011)** tot42 -0.004(0.010)  
op31 -0.002(0.002)  op41 -0.000(0.003)  
op32 0.001(0.009) op42 0.000(0.008) 
Average R2 
0.42 
Average R2 0.56 
 H0:All 2nd lag parameters=0 : 
                         Average χ2(24) = 
 
347*** 
 
Note: The significance of the test statistic for a null hypothesis of zero for parameters is shown as *  at the 10% level, ** at 5%, 
and *** at 1%. 
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FIGURE 1 
Deviations from National AggregateWages
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FIGURE 2 
Deviations from National AggregatePrices
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FIGURE 3 
D e v ia t io n s  fr o m  N a t io n a l A g g r e g a te E m p lo y m e n t
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FIGURE 4 
Deviations from National AggregateLabourForce
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FIGURE 5 
Comparing Aggregate Forecast Performances  
of the Aggregate, Pooled and Mean Group Procedures 
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Note: The 3 models are first estimated from 1972:3-1996:1, and 1 to 12 quarter step forecasts produced. Then 
they are re-estimated with one more observation and one less step forecast, until the end of the sample, 1999:1, 
is reached. The root mean square and Theil statistics are based on the averages available for each step across 
all the forecasts for a model. Therefore the 12 step forecast statistics are based on only 1 observation while the 
1 step statistics are based on 12 observations. The Theil U statistic is a unit-free measure which compares the 
model  forecasts with a no-change forecast, and so a value less than 1 is preferred.  
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FIGURE 6 
Comparing State Forecast Performances of the Pooled and Individual State Procedures 
State Wage Growth Forecasts 
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State Employment Growth Forecasts 
Pooled vs Individual State Regressions
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State Labour Force Growth Forecasts 
Pooled vs Individual State Regressions
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Note: Figure 5. The Theil U differential is the difference between the Theil U statistics for step forecasts of state variables from the pooled 
procedure and separate state regressions. If the differential is less than 0, the pooled procedure is preferred.. 
 
 
